

INTERROGATION COURSE -
LECTURES BY MR. SANFORD GRIFFITH.

Copy No. 3.

Series of Talks by Sanford Griffith, formerly Major Inf.
In Charge of Su-Section G-2 Prisoners and Documents I Army A.E.F.

Prepared for THIRD ARMY SCHOOL, San Antonio, Texas, April 20, 1942

DISCUSSION I ---- INTERVIEWING IN ARMY INTELLIGENCE

In these two discussions we will study:

- I. The place of interviewing* in research.
- II. Interrogating and interviewing in relation to Army Intelligence.

I. Interviewing in Research Generally

Asking direct questions is ordinarily the best and quickest way to get answers. This should be axiomatic, but it is taking us a long time to recognize it. Many of us beat about the bush in trying to get an answer which a direct question would have sufficed, and imagine that we are being clever. For example, I recall at the New York World's Fair an erudite professor who worried for months over formulating indirect questions to disclose peoples' incomes. We found it much simpler to ask them direct. Over 90% told us. We assumed that about one in 10 over-stated and one under stated. But then answers averaged out accurately enough for all practical purposes.

In interrogating German prisoners, we must devote most of our study to direct interviewing because time will be short, and three-fourths of our results will come from our asking of direct questions.

People love to answer questions. This goes for German prisoners--if asked right. We answer for a number of reasons. Most of these, however, boil down to interest in ourselves, our liking of others' interest in ourselves, a desire to show how much we know, and our desire to please. Then there is the semi-reflex habit of just talking. Our problem is to stimulate this urge to answer our questions. Starting with easy routine chatter, we must generate a momentum in the answering until we get a flow of information. The net product is answers - information about enemy intentions, troop movements, mechanical detail, and anything - everything about conditions around us.

Let us not be superior about this interrogating and imagine that, while we are able to get things out of the Germans, we are all closemouthed ourselves. The truth is that we are susceptible to the same kinds of persuasion and pressure. The Germans will learn plenty. We must assume that they will ferret out and study ways to exploit our weaknesses. But I do not believe that they are operating as effectively in this field as we can, if we employ the full range of techniques, developed in psychological research, and that we are already using in social and commercial fields.

Commercial development of Techniques of interviewing.

(1) Interviewing is becoming science, mainly worked out in detail for 30 years and more by psychologists and by psycho-analysts in analyzing individuals. (2) For some 20 years it has been increasingly applied to social fields, such as the study of town and factory conditions. (3) In the measure of political opinion, interviewing has been developed by Gallup and several others, including ourselves. This opinion polling work takes

* Interrogation suggests a more general and imposed type of questioning than interviewing. I am using the words interchangeably. Much of the best information we get will be given us voluntarily, as the result of informal interviewing.

two forms - extensive and intensive. The extensive survey may be local or national. It is usually an opinion poll comprising several simple yes and no questions. These extensive surveys are of less interest to us in the interrogation of prisoners. If and when we get a large number of prisoners a few general questions about their political attitudes will be of value in our propaganda and in activities toward a post war Europe. For our assignment, intensive individual interviewing is the type which gives us most of our information.

For some typical applications of intensive interviewing, I might enumerate several of the jobs handled by my organization in the last year or two: testing the public's preferences and degree of interest in radio programs for broadcasting companies; attendance analyses at the New York World's Fair; including questions about everything people came to see, from the Hall of Inventions to the strip tease side-shows; children's milk-drinking habits, amateur photographic interests of different age groups; women's preferences for some colors and smells over others; the public's attitude toward monopolies during the Monopoly Investigations in 1938; and, since the outbreak of World War II, a wide range of political surveys, mainly concerning attitudes toward the belligerents, isolationism, opinions on best measures for U.S. defense, and on the best ways to defeat the Axis.

The above range, of course, includes more techniques than we need to use in interviewing prisoners for battle-order information. At the same time, these new techniques permit us to push our interviewing much further with present day prisoners than during World War I. We can get more data and get it more efficiently. We can reduce our margins of error due to personal shortcomings. We can standardize our questionnaires in further fields. We can make a much fuller classification of our results. We can make more correlations and, very important, we can get the results out in much faster than in the old days. A time-saver on routine data will be tabulating, card punching, and sorting the cards through Hollerith machines. Thus on receipt of each new batch of prisoners we will be able to correlate data with that on old prisoners and have the results available for the staff. For example, much factional and statistical reports such as personal and unit identification, statistical data on unit strength and quantities of supplies, can be treated in an entirely routine way, card punched, sorted and correlated with previous data and with results available to the Staff within a couple of hours. This is important because many of these correlations were not available in World War I and many others came too late to be of use in current operations.

Interviewing as Science and Art. Most commercial interviewing and probably 75% of ours in the Army falls into the category of science. There remains 25% which must be regarded as an art. The unusual prisoner will require the unusual interviewer and delicate handling. Even then if the time is short, this additional information will mostly be lost. But if time permits and if the prisoner has important information, the interviewer can prolong his interview and match wits to coax it out of him. It frequently pays to provide congenial softening surroundings which facilitate this work. (Stool-pigeon techniques and special prison surroundings should be provided).

II. Interviewing in Relation to Army Intelligence.

At least 90% of information about the enemy in this War will come from the direct interviewing of prisoners and from a study of enemy documents picked up on the battle field. Estimates in World War I went as high as 80% for information from these sources. The proportion should be larger at present because: (a) interviewing techniques have been improved; (b) in this total world war other contact with the enemy, such as through neutral countries and indirect commercial relations, have been reduced to a few threads. This inter-change of ordinary commercial and travel relations between belligerent and neutral countries provided the major amount of information. Also so ruthless have been Nazi suppressions that espionage output available from Central Europe is estimated at not more than 30% of World War I. Because of the low quality of most espionage information

anyway shortage is no serious loss.

Great opportunity for Intelligence Service. This is a great opportunity for our intelligence officers. We alone will have a continuous direct first-hand contact with the Germans. We will thus be best placed to get a full picture of German conditions, generally. It is also a great opportunity for us because of our work, if well done, can be translated directly into saving American lives and into destruction of the enemy. No research in wartime can be of greater service than this interrogation of prisoners.

This interrogation assignment is also a great responsibility. While we have access to the best sources of information, it depends on our zeal and ability as individual interviewers to dig out the information and, to get it in usable form to the Commander. No book of rules nor instruction can get around the simple fact that the result will only be as valuable as the individual interviewer makes it. Our making effective contacts with the prisoners, asking the right questions, being careful in recording our answers, and then presenting the information effectively are all essential links in this chain.

Comparison of different types of interviewing. How does interviewing war prisoners compare with the work of a reporter, a salesman, and of a police sergeant --- three people who ask plenty of questions?

The job of the intelligence officer at the front comes closest to that of a newspaper reporter. The reporter gets an assignment from his city editor to cover a fire or a murder. Frequently he gets a slant on what to look for. He is expected to get the facts, and to shoot them back fast to the City Desk. The reporter is held personally responsible for the accuracy of his reporting.

All this applies to intelligence officers in interviewing prisoners. Our job differs, however, from that of the reporter in that we are not expected to dramatize nor to build up our stories. Also, on essential identifications we are expected to follow a well-defined procedure. While ours is not to romanticize, we must present our story with clarity and forcefully. A news sense helps us in both timing and emphasis.

The salesman is more handicapped than the reporter because, in addition to getting his prospect to talk, he must persuade him to listen. Furthermore, he must persuade him to hand over his money. This is tough. We have not this hard task and do not need to and cannot spend the same amount of time on our prospect as does a salesman.

In getting a prisoner to talk, we have a decided advantage over both the reporter and the salesman. We, in common with the police sergeant, actually have physical custody of our men. He is our prisoner, and we dictate the surroundings and timing of the interrogation. We should exploit this advantage to the limit to get as full and fast a story as we can.

As far as the prisoner is concerned, we are the "Voice of Authority". The police sergeant, if he uses old-fashioned police methods, thumps the table, and occasionally the culprit. We can do table thumping too if we choose, but we have a handicap he has not. The police sergeant is also the voice of Law and Order. He can exhort the law violator to repent and to become a good citizen. But to the German prisoner, we are the "Voice of the Enemy". When he talks to us, he can even boast of his achievements in bumping off Americans and knows that we cannot punish him for being a good soldier. Also, when he talks to us, he may well feel that he is violating his own military code. He has been repeatedly told that if he blabs, he will have to answer to a court martial when he gets back home.

This is a bad angle for us. We must sing him to sleep on this issue. There is, however, a compensating factor for us which often the police sergeant lacks. We get the prisoner when he has just been face-to-face with death, and is in a low physical and mental state. We also are, as has been pointed out, the "Voice of Authority", and his entire training has been to respect authority.

We have to create this illusion of the transfer of authority to us. We also have another decided advantage. If we cannot win our prospect by friendliness, we also can use pressure. But friendly, informal handling is quickest and usually opens more fields of information.

The Fatigue Factor in Questioning. How can you get people to answer 10 to 20 questions consecutively? This is usually all we would be asking. The fatigue limit is much further off than you would imagine. I have repeatedly tested the endurance of the interviewed, and am impressed myself at how much they will take. I have asked up to 100 questions, taking 40 minutes to get answers and at the noisiest, goofiest place in the world to ask them - at a State Fair at Trenton, N.J. If your personal approach is right, and if people are interested in the subject, they usually welcome an invitation to talk. Incidentally, contrary to popular belief, business executives are more willing to spend time in answering a serious questionnaire than are small people. They themselves are more accustomed to giving and getting information. This will apply to educated Germans and to German officers in spite of restrictions against them talking. Quantitatively we will do best with the non-coms. We will find that we will get better information from the higher-ups than from the rank-and-file. A preliminary condition with officers will be more careful planning of the kind of atmosphere which will stimulate them to talk.

Need for pre-tests under war conditions. Although I have set up a wide variety of questionnaires and have interviewed numerous Nazis, all this is no substitute for pre-tests of all of our questionnaires based on actual interviewing of prisoners under war conditions. No amount of previous experience can serve as a substitute. This means that we should have access to a large variety of interviews of German prisoners already made in this war. We must also interview numerous Germans first-hand ourselves. Such experience will inevitably alter any questionnaire we set up in advance. We should also alter it to fit into our information needs in a given operation. There is, however, basic identification data which can be used in a routine way in almost all questionnaires.

Keep military application foremost. It is important that our study in the field be anchored to actual military use. The field which interviewers' contacts with the German Army and civilian population will open in theoretical research, in psychology, sociology, and in a variety of political fields is tremendous. There will be constant temptations to get off into theoretical research or into less important side-paths. There will also be a temptation to shift into a psychological terminology which is not readily understood by the soldier who has not specialized in this type of research. Our work is of no value unless it is in a readily intelligible form for the staff. This is why in each step of the work it is well for the research people to keep in close collaboration with experienced soldiers who will advise the best practical application of the interview material. Also, in the field, pressure of time will frequently be such that adaptability and agility in work under a variety of difficult conditions will be more useful than a heavy baggage of theory and elaborate classifications.

Keep an open mind. In this work, we interviewers should not set out to prove any preconceived theory - neither our own nor that of anybody else. We should ask the questions, get the facts, correlate them, and then present our conclusions. As this War gets tough for us, and the Germans give us a full taste of total war, our attitudes toward the Germans are bound to get more hostile and emotional. "All Germans are baby killers"; "the Nazi fighting machine is invincible"; "You can't believe a word they say"; "The Germans take no prisoners", and so on. Individuals in any army are as susceptible to extreme opinions and emotional attitudes as anybody else. The commander, himself, may have very strong prejudices. This puts an added responsibility on us interviewers to get the facts and to keep them well in view. An intelligence officer who lets himself be loaded down by a baggage of set prejudices about the German is handicapping his usefulness as an interviewer. His job is to present the facts as he finds them - clearly, simply, and as objectively as possible.

Series of Talks by Sanford Griffith, formerly Maj Inf.
In Charge of Sub-Section G-2 Prisoners and Documents I Army A.E.F.

DISCUSSION V --- SOME NAZI WEAKNESSES TO EXPLOIT

Among exploitable German attitudes and weaknesses, we include: (1) vanity, (2) venality, (3) lack of broad basic education, (4) consequent lack of sense of proportion, (5) the school teacher urge, (6) dependence on slogans rather than on solid study, (7) a quiz enthusiasm, (8) over-bureaucratization, (9) gangster mentality of leaders, (10) Nazi double-standards, (11) widespread superstitions, (12) craving of outside recognition.

This brief enumeration of some exploitable attitudes should not be accepted as leading to any general conclusion of Nazi weakness. In fact they are still going strong. The purpose of this study is to emphasize simply some known German and Nazi weaknesses open to exploitation by our Intelligence people.

Chance in Nazi Victories. We are too inclined to look at the succession of Nazi victories and to accept Nazi propaganda pretensions of Nazi military omniscience at their face value. There is no doubt that German higher strategy in this war has been remarkable. It is a temptation of the newspaper reporter particularly when convenient propaganda is available to interpret luck and hindsight as careful planning and foresight. For example, we should not overlook the fact that much of Germany's emphasis on modern weapons was imposed by the arms restrictions of Versailles on construction of the old ones. One's own weaknesses can be made to appear militancy prowess of the enemy. Witness the collapse of France. Chance plays a large part in military success and failure. Granted that Germany has command of highly qualified professional soldiers, there are but some 33,000 out of 210,000 officers or about 1 in 7. Also they are mostly in the higher ranks and are not those we will often encounter and interview. When we get into the ranks of the reserve officers we will find plenty of weaknesses to expose and to exploit.

1. Nazi Vanity. There is a colossal amount of vanity, self adulation, and noisy boasting in Nazi circles. All the way down through the Party, they emulate Big Noise Hitler. Little thugs like to think of themselves and to make a noise as big-shots. Probably few Nazi big-shots will come into our net. But some of the smaller fry will seek to impress us that they are big-shots. We should give them all the encouragement in this that we can. They have information about relations between the Nazi Party and Army we can well use. If it tickles their ego to show us how important as officials they are and how much they know, why not? Some of this vanity will have been translated into daring and hardihood. But much of it should be chalked up as hot air. Some of it is downright neurotic. Almost the last refuge of weakness and lack of self-confidence is bravado. It is common for a group dubious of their position to bolster one another up with hurrahs. But this is not the present interpretation we should make. We must recognize that the Nazis are arrogant mainly because they are strong and because they have virtually achieved Hitler's initial objective - the conquest of Europe. We must, therefore, recognize this phase of Nazi pride as mainly due to accomplishment.

Deflating the Rather-Die-than-be-Captured Ego. A prisoner is himself a living contradiction of the assertion "I'd rather die than be captured", or of the cliché Nazi assertion of readiness "to die for the Führer". Ordinarily the number of volunteers for suicide squads is small. In peace times, there have been epidemics of suicide under romantic surroundings, such as in Japan hari-kiri for the deceased Emperor, or in Germany love-lorn girls hurling themselves to death over a millrace after seeing a romantic moonlight picture of a lovelorn beautiful girl in such an act. But the closer most people come to facing death, the more they instinctively pull back from it. This also applies to many would-be suicides. Actually we only hear of the small minority who go through with it and not of the many who pull back in time.

Authority

DECLASSIFIED

Romantic bravado is in modern mechanized warfare. Also daring and bravado are at their lowest ebb in a war prisoner. Soldiers who boast of their readiness for a hero's death before battle, are usually sufficiently shaken after facing death during the fight, to be relieved at being alive as prisoners. In long experience, I only encountered one or two prisoners who kept a story-book hero's attitude after heavy fighting and after our prolonged grilling interrogation. The state of being hungry, dirty, and exhausted have a depressing, deflating effect on anybody, and particularly on a soldier.

A few of them will be active defeatists who planned in advance to make a break and get away on the first opportunity. They have usually a bitter grievance against the Nazi system and are ready to talk. Then there are passive defeatists who surrender, much as they went into battle, because it is the course of least resistance at the time. Such prisoners are fairly cooperative because it continues to be their path of least resistance. But they are usually rather apathetic and poor observers.

Most of the prisoners, whether they admit it or not, are relieved at being alive, intact, and out of the fight. It is this brief period of complete physical and emotional let-down that we must exploit to the limit. It is this moment, too, that German psychologists go to the most trouble to condition troops against.

People seek to Register Superior Intelligence. An urge to make a show of intellectual superiority and good taste goes in the German Army as well as in the world outside. For example, in our own daily home life peoples' actual reading is on a lower level than what we usually admit publicly. This is why a check on magazines thrown out at the back door discloses mostly Red Book, True Story and Liberty Magazine, while people prefer to pretend that Harpers, the Atlantic Monthly and the National Geographic go in at the front door. Such harmless little vanities lend themselves to easy exploitation.

The Germans are afflicted with this sort of harmless vanity. This is particularly true of the self-trained small man. Let him feel that we regard him as a great man in his field, and we will be amply rewarded. Let him get off on his special knowledge, and he will go to great lengths to show us how much he knows. The Germans have their full quota of amateur strategists who know all the answers, and who likes to show off even to the enemy.

2. Nazi Venality. Nazi venality deserves special study because it is one of the most brazen affronts to all idealism and is a weakness that we must exploit to the limit. There was never a German regime which indulged in graft on the scale of the Nazi bureaucracy. Berchtesgaden and Karinhall are monuments to it. The higher Party officials have all had a hand, or rather both hands, in the home loot. Goering, with his feudal palaces and hunting lodges, has made Germany into one large game preserve. Ribbentrop has gone in for chateaus and objects d'art, contributed by "admirers" or stolen in the course of his liquidating political enemies. Goebbels, not to be outdone, has "acquired" a half dozen palaces, plus an assortment of lovenests. Smaller Party officials have more modestly grabbed soft but well-paid industrial jobs, profitable concessions, and accepted costly gifts from business concerns.

This gangster cashing-in even goes down into the younger generation Party members. They gossip about the fat living of their chiefs, but less with resentment than with envy and in anticipation of cutting into the pie themselves as soon as they come into power. We should collect typical stories and purvey them particularly to the German soldiers who are already rebelling at the discriminatory inside their own ranks.

3. Nazi Lack of Education Privileges. The Nazi pride themselves on knowing all the answers. But the German educational system was one of the first to be completely integrated into the Nazi propaganda structure. University training was curtailed and retarded. The Regular Army Staff complained bitterly that officer candidates sponsored by the Nazi Party had been taught slogans rather than ideas, and were backward even in the three "R's". Shortage of man power since the War is now driving Nazis down into boy scout material. Incidentally, the youngest recruits are bitter at having their educations cut short.

This lack of knowledge relates particularly to world affairs. The Germans make a great to-do about their knowledge of geography. With their regular army and older university people this pride is justified. More emphasis was put on geography and there was more popular interest in world affairs in Germany than in most countries. But the Nazi propagandists, with their pseudo-"geopolitik," distorted this to their own ends. Actually, since the Nazis took over they have been fed a kind of romantic propaganda geography predicated on the conception of Germany as the center of the universe and based on the assumption of Nazi superiority and right to rule the world. One exception were the youth and worker tours of various parts of Europe conducted in the three or four years prior to the war. These however were taken by but a small fraction of the workers whose stolen insurance funds went to help pay for them. Nothing has a more hollow ring today than Ley's "Strength through joy" swindle. The war however reduced the German peoples knowledge of the outside world to Nazi propaganda. The Germans are badly informed, worse informed than they were in World War I. This is a weakness that will become increasingly evident when the Nazi morale curve has begun to decline, and is one we must exploit to the utmost.

The Germans have not been conditioned to reverses and defeats. Such words have even been stricken from the official military and political vocabularies. With no such preliminary conditioning, how will these Nazis take reverses? I believe that they will be emotionally crippled. But we must draw our conclusions mainly from actual observations in the field.

4. Consequent Lack of Sense of Proportion in Education. The older generation of Nazis have travelled very little abroad. They lived for years in the narrow confines of Germany and of their own frustrations. They came into power on exaggerations and propaganda slogans. While Nazi teachers seek to deceive their pupils, they do preliminarily a fair job of deceiving themselves. This is a story of the bond salesman who was told by St. Peter that heaven was too crowded with fellow bond salesmen to get in himself, and hit upon the idea of telling them that there was a big market for bonds in hell. The idea worked, and in a few moments there were no bond salesmen left in heaven, except our friend, waiting at the gate to get in. St. Peter stood aside for him to enter, but instead the bond salesman turned his back on the pearly gates and dashed off after his colleagues. "Who knows," he cried, "there may be something in it after all." This lack of a true sense of values is most conspicuous in Nazis own appraisal of Germany's chances to win. They actually know very little about American man-power and or our industrial potential, and are susceptible to a piling up of facts about our resources, industrial capacity, and our increasing military might. Giving them glimpses of our size has a useful deflationary effect on the prisoner.

5. The School-Teacher Urge. School teachers were especially welcome at our little school at the front and were always among our star pupils. The Germans developed a peculiarly virulent teacher-knows-best type. He was accustomed to standing up before his class and lecturing by the hour. It was our function to identify ourselves with his knowledge-eager school boys. He would then tell us about the history of the area we were fighting over. Imagine our not knowing that this was the very land once ruled by Charlemagne, and what a distortion of history not to refer to him as the great German Emperor Kaiser Karl! And did we know about the flora and the fauna along the Moselle River? Were we making our notes in an orderly way? This sort of pedant was a push-over. He is not so much so today. In the good old Kaiser days, teacher had considerable individuality and prestige. In the new Nazi setup, those who stayed in have slipped into the Nazi mold and have become more of a subdued phonograph for the Party line. His humanities today served to trick him into a fallacious identification of Spartan austere living and courage with Nazi privations. But he still has his old school-teacher urge. Furthermore, this school-teacher urge is widespread German urge. German school children play teacher-and-pupils as a favorite game. Many of them will now welcome a chance to play teacher again. We can only benefit by sitting at their feet - during the interview.

6. Ask me Another, Please. There is a type of soldier who ought to live in the middle of a quiz game. If the spark can be provided to touch him off, he demonstrates his cleverness as long as he is challenged with questions. "Don't tell me the answer - let me guess". I recall one German sergeant, who, from his training, should have known better. When he had given me a dozen valuable items, he would wring his hands, "I only wish I knew the answers to more of your questions!" Numerous little guessing game stunts can be trotted out very effectively.

7. Over-Bureaucratization. Much-vaunted Nazi efficiency is at its weakest in the piling up of new offices and new agencies. The Nazis showed imagination and ability in setting up the broad structure of their New European Order as an exploitation economy. But in execution, they have loaded down their economy with a multiplicity of administrative office regulations and forms. At the start their hungry, mostly unorganized members of the lower middle class, demanded jobs. They wanted to get into the flesh pots of the bankers and industrialists. It was always easier to create a new office for new activities rather than fit them into existing services. Also, new offices meant more jobs. This was Nazi Party philosophy and practice. The consequent multiplication of offices meant multiplication of paper work. The shortcomings of this sort of expansion are not particularly noticeable in an expanding economy, such as the conquest of successive European countries over the last six years. But with a stabilized or contracting economy, the over-loaded structure becomes a menacing dead weight.

This dead load extends over into the Army. It is a sore point with the older Army officers. The older generation resent and distrust this Nazi development. Incidentally, in our interrogation there is no one easier to squeeze than a physically timorous bureaucrat. And, finally, we can play this whole paperwork class off against rank-and-file German soldiers who are beginning to understand that they are the under dogs who are carrying this dead weight of bureaucracy.

9. Building up the Nazi Gangster Ideal. In a police state reaching down into the privacy of the family, spies are everywhere and denunciation flourishes. Children are taught to denounce their parents for lack of Nazi ardor. At training camps, the youth learn to despise their home life and become as a Nazi Government minister said: "tough, like leather and enduring, like Krupp steel." (A plug for Krupps). Several children who denounced their parents for lack of Nazi "enthusiasm" have been saluted as patriots. All this is nauseating to the older Germans.

The Nazi Party catch the children young and held on to them until the Army takes them over. The Party provides fanatical political and gangster backgrounds. Later, they are taught to sink their personal identities in the mass Army. As Minister Franck and other Nazi politicians put it -- the mission of the German people is to fight and to die for Hitler. But, in gangster tradition, when not robbing strangers, they are busy at home cutting one another's throats for power.

Hardening in preliminary training is so severe, that many boys actually find conditions at the front (Not Russian) easier than in the training period. This is particularly true of the young aviators who at the front enjoy a special regime of comforts and delicacies and live in the best hotels. The young Nazi, product of this system, presents a new problem to the interviewer. I have prepared a special study of their training in the official Nazi schools called Ordensburg. The S.S. Nazi elite units in the ordeal of fire on the Russian front, are said not to have stood up as well as their propaganda prestige promised. Will they stand up better or worse than regular army units? Bitter internal personal hostilities exist behind the Nazi facade, the more intense as the war strain increases. Behind the facade of Nazi Party unit are personal animosities which are as ruthless as in any other gangster community. These offer us a rare opportunity to play one Nazi off against another. But it will only be after interviewing a large number of them in the field that we can set up adequate interviewing procedure.

DECLASSIFIED